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THE TEXAS TWO-STEP: EVIDENCE ON THE LINK
BETWEEN DAMAGE CAPS AND ACCESS TO THE
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Stephen Daniels* and Joanne Martin**

INTRODUCTION

"What's the real cause of the state's growing liability crisis, and resulting restrictions on patient access to care? Simply put, it's an outof-control legal system."1 This quotation is taken from a "Dear Colleague" letter written by the chairman of ISMIE Mutual Insurance
Company, a physician-owned, medical malpractice insurer in Illinois.
It is a strongly worded, almost angry letter meant to refute the claims
of plaintiffs' lawyers and consumer groups who are "blaming insurance company practices and bad medicine for Illinois' deteriorating
'2
medical liability climate."
The letter argues that plaintiffs' lawyers and consumer groups are
distorting the issues, "thus diverting attention from the explosive
growth of lawsuits and awards-trends from which they reap huge
profits."' 3 More specifically, the letter writer concludes that the key
problem is noneconomic damages. Such damages are characterized as
"[t]he primary cost driver in medical liability ' 4 because they are the
source of those "huge profits" for plaintiffs' lawyers, who work on a
contingency fee basis. 5 The letter concludes, "The legal system should
fairly compensate patients injured by medical negligence, but exorbitant, non-economic damage awards-the pot from which lawyers' fees
'6
are taken-must be controlled before more doctors flee Illinois."
The message of the Dear Colleague letter is clear-a central purpose of the effort to cap damages is to make medical malpractice
* Senior Research Fellow, American Bar Foundation, Chicago, IL 60611.
** Senior Research Fellow, American Bar Foundation, Chicago, IL 60611. The authors wish
to thank Melissa Derr for assistance.
1. Letter from Harold L. Jensen, M.D., Chairman, ISMIE Mutual Insurance Company, to
policy holders, Chicago, IL (Dec. 12, 2003) (on file with authors).
2. Id.
3. Id. We presume the huge profits are being reaped just by the plaintiffs' lawyers and are not
being shared with consumer groups.
4. Id.

5. Id.
6. Id.
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claims less profitable and hence less attractive to plaintiffs' lawyers
working on a contingency fee basis. Limited damages mean limited
contingency fees. 7 If medical malpractice cases become less profitable, then plaintiffs' lawyers (presumed to be rational, self-interested
actors) will be less interested in handling such cases and move on to
other, more profitable markets. The important question is what happens when the logic of this initial consequence unfolds. If the logic
works, there should be fewer medical malpractice claims-not because there will be fewer injury-causing medical errors and hence
fewer potential cases of medical negligence, but because there will be
fewer lawyers interested in handling such cases. 8 Should this logic
manifest itself fully, meaningful access to the civil justice system for
some injured people may be diminished since meaningful access requires competent legal representation.
Our interest is in exploring the possible link between damage caps
and access to the civil justice system, and in doing so we will draw
from our empirical research in Texas. Our research focuses on the
effects of tort reform on plaintiffs' lawyers and their practices. 9 In
7. The Report on Contingent Fees in Medical Malpractice Litigation, prepared by the Tort Trial
and Insurance Practice Section (TIPS) of the American Bar Association, concluded that limitations on the contingent fee "would reduce the incidence of meritorious medical malpractice actions and further reduce legal exposure for those who commit medical malpractice." JAMES K.
CARROLL ET AL., ABA. SEC. TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. REP., Report on Contingent Fees in
Medical Malpractice Litigation 11 (2004).
8. On the amount of death and injury resulting from medical error in hospitals and the costs,
see INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, To ERR is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 26-48
(Linda Kohn et al. eds., 2000). According to the Institute of Medicine,
Preventable adverse events are a leading cause of death in the United States. When
extrapolated to the over 33.6 million admissions to U.S. hospitals in 1997, the results of
these two studies [one in New York, the other in Colorado and Utah] imply that at least
44,000 and perhaps as many as 98,000 Americans die in hospitals each year as a result
of medical errors. Even when using the lower estimate ... [d]eaths due to preventable
adverse events exceed the deaths attributable to motor vehicle accidents (43,458),
breast cancer (42,297) or AIDS (16,516).
Id. at 26 (internal citations omitted).
9. We have reported on this research in Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Strange Success of Tort Reform, 53 EMORY L.J. 1225 (2004) [hereinafter Daniels & Martin, Strange Success];
Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, It Was the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of Times: The
PrecariousNature of Plaintiffs' Practice in Texas, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1781 (2002) [hereinafter Daniels & Martin, It Was the Best of Times]; Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, "The Impact that It
Has Had Is Between People's Ears": Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs' Lawyers, 50
DEPAUL L. REV. 453 (2000); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, "It's Darwinism-Survival of
the Fittest:" How Markets and Reputations Shape the Ways in Which Plaintiffs' Lawyers Obtain
Clients, 21 LAW & POLIY 377 (1999) [hereinafter Daniels & Martin, Darwinism]. Our initial
research involved ninety-six, in-depth interviews with Texas plaintiffs' lawyers and a major mail
survey of Texas plaintiffs' lawyers with 554 useable responses [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Lawyer
Survey]. A detailed description of our methodology and the data we collected can be found in It
Was the Best of Times, supra, at 1826-28. We are currently in the process of again interviewing
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2003, Texas passed major tort reform legislation with the primary, although not exclusive, focus on capping noneconomic damage awards
in healthcare cases and putting tighter controls on what is needed to
demonstrate economic damages. Specifically, House Bill 4, An Act
Relating to Reform of Certain Procedures and Remedies in Civil Actions (HB4), capped noneconomic damages at $250,000 for a single
healthcare claim and $750,000 for such claims involving multiple defendants. 10 In the words of one recent law review commentary, "The
centerpiece of HB4 was article 10, which proposed hard caps on all
noneconomic damages awarded to patients in medical-malpractice
suits." 11 The legislation also included new jury instructions on economic damages, requiring that such damages be awarded only upon
the demonstration of actual losses incurred and evidence of the net
loss after reduction for income tax payments. The idea here is to prevent the inflation of economic damages to make up for any diminution
12
in noneconomic damages due to the cap.
Once passed, HB4's supporters immediately moved to amend the
Texas Constitution in order to block a constitutional challenge to the
new limitations on noneconomic damage awards.1 3 Proposition 12, its
name on the state ballot, stated:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this constitution, the legislature by statute may determine the limit of liability for all damages and losses, however characterized, other than economic
damages, of a provider of medical or health care with respect to
treatment, lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from an
accepted standard of medical or health care or safety, however characterized, that is or is claimed to be a cause of, or that contributes or
14
is claimed to contribute to, disease, injury, or death of a person.
plaintiffs' lawyers in Texas, and we have conducted ten of twenty planned interviews. In addition, as of this writing, another mail survey of plaintiffs' lawyers in Texas is in process.
10. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.301(a)-(c) (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 2003).
11. James L. "Larry" Wright & M. Matthew Williams, Remember the Alamo: The Seventh
Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Doctrine of Incorporation, and State Caps on
Jury Awards, 45 S.TEX. L. REV. 449, 455 (2004).
12. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Caps, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 391 (2005), for the proposition that caps on noneconomic damages may lead to
an increase in economic damages.
13. See Wright & Williams, supra note 11, at 455-58. This strategy was needed because of the
1988 Texas Supreme Court decision in Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988), which
struck down similar caps as violating Article 1, section 13 of the Texas State Constitution: "All
courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law." Id. at 696. A possible response to this
constitutional strategy in Texas would be a federal constitutional challenge using the Seventh
Amendment's right to a trial by jury in civil cases, a right that has yet to be applied to the states.
See Wright & Williams, supra note 11, at 464-517.
14. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 66(b).
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The proposal passed and is particularly important because it goes beyond protecting the cap in healthcare cases and allows the legislature
to enact caps in other cases as well: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this constitution, after January 1, 2005, the legislature by statute may determine the limit of liability for all damages and losses,
however characterized, other than economic damages, in a claim or
cause of action not covered by Subsection (b) of this section. 15 Enacting any such limitation would require a three-fifths majority in both
16
houses of the state legislature.
Set against this new legal environment in Texas, we will explore
how caps can affect access to the civil justice system by examining how
caps affect the business of plaintiffs' law. We do so because plaintiffs'
lawyers function as the civil justice system's gatekeepers, and the gates
will widen or narrow depending on the profitability of the lawyers'
practices. 17 We will pay special attention to the processes surrounding
how plaintiffs' lawyers obtain and screen cases. Acquiring and screening cases is crucial for plaintiffs' lawyers since their profitability requires an ongoing flow of clients with injuries that the civil justice
system will compensate adequately. 18 Here, "compensate adequately" means compensation that will allow lawyers to collect their
fees and recoup their investment in a matter without shortchanging
the client. Anything that may affect the value of a case, such as a
damage cap, is likely to alter the decision as to what the lawyer believes will constitute adequate compensation and ultimately whether
to take a case. If the cap's effect is substantial, it could even influence
the lawyer's decision to continue handling such matters altogether.
Working with our Texas data, we will examine the potential impact of
caps for plaintiffs' lawyers generally,1 9 and then for medical malpractice specialists-the lawyers most directly affected by the Texas cap.
15. Id. § 66(c).
16. Id. § 66(e).
17. See HERBERT

JACOB, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES

123 (1986); Herbert M.

Kritzer, Contingency Fee Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the Civil Justice System, 81 JUDICATURE 22
(1997); Joanne Martin & Stephen Daniels, Access Denied: Tort Reform is Closing the Courthouse

Door, TRIAL, July 1997, at 26.
18. See HERBERT M. KRITZER,

RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LE-

45-95 (2004), on the importance of getting clients for
lawyers using the contingency fee in Wisconsin and the sources of clients.
19. We think it is important to look at that general picture first. While the discussion and
debate over caps has focused on medical malpractice and other health-related cases, we should
not lose sight of the fact that caps could be placed on any kind of money damage case. The
potential for this broader application is illustrated by Proposition 12 in Texas, which specifically
authorizes caps on noneconomic damage in health-related cases and also authorizes caps in any
other type of case.
GAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES
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These two issues will be dealt with in sections A and B, respectively,
of Part III of this article.
In addition to working with the data we collected on Texas plaintiffs' lawyers, we will also utilize data from a 2004 survey conducted by
the State Bar of Texas. That survey focused on referral practices
among lawyers in Texas. 20 Few empirical studies of referral practices
among lawyers exist, and we know virtually nothing of the possible
impact of damage caps (or other tort reform measures) on these practices. 2 t Yet, referral systems are an important aspect of meaningful
access. Referral systems, especially those like the Texas system which
permits paid referrals,2 2 provide economic incentives to move cases
among lawyers so that they wind up in the hands of those better able
to handle them-the specialists. This is especially important for the
movement of complex or high-end tort cases like medical malpractice,
because the specialists who handle such matters rely heavily on referrals as a source of their business.2 3 Changes like damage caps that
make certain kinds of cases less economically attractive may alter the
incentives for either referring a case to a specialist or for a specialist to
accept a case, thereby potentially diminishing access to the most able
lawyers.
We will examine the potential impact of the Texas damage cap on
the referral system in section C of Part III of this article. But before
we begin Part III's exploration of damage caps and the business of
plaintiffs' law, it is necessary first to address the more general issue of
the link between damage caps and meaningful access to the civil jus20.

DEP'T OF RES. & ANALYSIS, STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS REFERRAL PRACTICES SUR-

(2004) [hereinafter TEXAS REFERRAL SURVEY]. The survey was done in conjunction with the State Bar of Texas Referral Fee Task Force. It was sent to a random sample of
4,000 active, in-state members of the State Bar of Texas in the spring of 2004. Id. at 3. (Texas is
a mandatory bar state, so this sample represents all active lawyers in the state.) Id. at 4. Of the
4,000 surveys sent, 1,215 completed surveys were returned (30.4%). This level of response
VEY REPORT

means a confidence interval of plus or minus three percentage points at the 95% significance
level. For a description of the survey's methodology, see id. at 3-7. The specific data used in this
article are on file with the authors, and the analyses reported in this paper were conducted by
the authors and represent only their interpretations and not those of the State Bar of Texas or
the Referral Fee Task Force.
21. See Thomas J. Hall & Joel C. Levy, Intra-Attorney Fee Sharing Arrangements, 11 VAL. U.
L. REV. 1 (1976) (giving a general background on referral fees); Stephen J. Spurr, Referral Practices Among Lawyers: A Theoretical and EmpiricalAnalysis, 13 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 87 (1988)
(providing a rare empirical analysis of referral fees); Luis Garicano & Tano Santos, Referrals
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8367, 2001) (focusing on theoretical consideration of referrals in general).
22. Data from the Texas Referral Survey show a mean referral fee of 29.9% and a median of
33.0% (percentage of the successful lawyer's fee paid to the referring lawyer). TEXAS REFERRAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 77.
23. See Daniels & Martin, It Was the Best of Times, supra note 9, at 1788-95.
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tice system. Part II addresses this issue and discusses three matters in
doing so: the political rhetoric surrounding caps and the reasons typically offered for enacting caps; an alternative purpose for caps,
namely diminishing access to the civil justice system by making certain
kinds of cases financially unattractive to plaintiffs' lawyers; and the
more general or longer term implications of making certain kinds of
cases financially unattractive to plaintiffs' lawyers.
II.

DAMAGE CAPS AND MEANINGFUL ACCESS TO THE CIVIL
JUSTICE SYSTEM

A.

Caps and Politics

The idea of capping noneconomic damage awards in medical malpractice cases has been at the forefront of the political efforts for malpractice reform. One reason can be seen in a series of polls sponsored
by insurance interests and by the American Medical Association since
at least the mid-1970s to gauge, among other things, public acceptance
of such caps. These polls suggest that reform efforts that focus on
noneconomic damage caps will resonate with the public.2 4 The most
recent polls show that people are willing to support limits on awards,
especially for "pain and suffering. '2 5 For instance, a late 2004 national
poll sponsored by the Kaiser Foundation asked respondents, "Would
you favor or oppose a new law that would put a limit on the amount of
money that can be awarded to someone suing a doctor for malpractice
for damages for pain and suffering?" 26 Sixty-three percent of respondents said that they would favor such a law and only thirty-three percent said they would oppose it.27
In five major national polls conducted between 1975 and 1993 that
asked whether people generally supported limits on awards in medical
malpractice cases, 28 the lowest level of support was fifty-seven percent
24. For the proposition that policy follows public opinion, see Larry M. Bartels, Constituency
Opinion and CongressionalPolicy Making: The Reagan Defense Buildup, 85 AM. POL. Sci. REV.

457 (1991); Benjamin I. Page & Robert Y. Shapiro, Effects of Public Opinion on Policy, 77 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 175 (1983); James A. Stimson et al., Dynamic Representation, 89 AM. POL. ScI.
REV. 543 (1995).
25. INTERNATIONAL

COMMUNICATIONS

RESEARCH (Nov. 2004) (accession no. 1614520)

(sponsored by Kaiser Family Foundation). All polls cited in this article are "maintained by the
Roper Center for Public Opinion Research" and are available at www.lexisnexis.com.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. GALLUP ORG. POLL (May 1975) (accession no. 46314); ROPER ORG. (June 1986) (acces-

sion no. 0151707) (sponsored by

ALL-INDUSTRY

RESEARCH ADVISORY COUNCIL); ROPER ORG.

(Aug. 1987) (accession no. 0129076); YANKELOVICH CLANCY SHULMAN (Aug. 1991) (accession

no. 166095) (sponsored by Time, C.N.N.); HART & TEETER RES. CO. (Mar. 1993) (accession no.
194163) (sponsored by NBC News, Wall Street Journal).

2006]

THE TEXAS TWO-STEP

641

of respondents (1987)29 and the highest was seventy-six percent
(1993).30 Another nine major polls conducted between 1986 and 2004

asked specifically about limits on "pain and suffering" awards in medical malpractice cases. 31 The lowest level of support for such limitations on awards was fifty-six percent (2003)32 and the highest was
seventy-eight percent (2002).33 Four of these nine polls were spon34
sored by the American Medical Association.
In line with these polls, the political rhetoric of medical malpractice

reform focuses on capping noneconomic damages. In Texas in 2003, it
was the primary issue in the debate over HB4 and then over Proposition 12.35 It was also the issue in a similar political effort in Florida in
2003, which led to three special sessions of the state legislature before
a compromise was reached on the amount for a cap. 36 Florida's governor, Jeb Bush, held out for a $250,000 cap, but finally agreed to a
$500,000 cap against physicians and a $750,000 cap against hospitals
37
and healthcare facilities.
A $250,000 cap is also at the heart of the proposal for federal medical malpractice legislation championed by President Bush in his January 2005 visit to Madison County, IL-one of the tort reformers' socalled "Judicial Hellholes. ' '38 A Chicago Sun-Times story on January
29. See ROPER

ORG.,

supra note 28.

30. See HART & TEETER RES. Co., supra note 28.
31. CAMBRIDGE REPORTS, RESEARCH INT'L (Apr. 1986) (accession no. 314182); KANE, PAR-

SONS AND Ass'NS (May 1986) (accession no. 75993) (sponsored by American Medical Association); Louis HARRIS & Assoc. (Sept. 1986) (accession no. 72667) (sponsored by Atena Life and
Casualty); GALLUP ORG. POLL (Jan. 1989), (accession no. 45528) (sponsored by American Medical Association); GALLUP ORG. POLL (Jan. 1992) (accession no. 189879) (sponsored by American Medical Association); McLAUGHLIN & Assoc. (Sept. 2002) (accession no. 425220)
(sponsored by United Seniors Association); GALLUP ORG. POLL (Jan. 2003) (accession no.
0419966); FABRIZIO McLAUGHLIN & ASSOC., PETER HART RES. Assoc. (Mar. 2003) (accession

no. 0428637) (sponsored by American Medical Association); INT'L COMM. RES. (Nov. 2004) (accession no. 1614520) (sponsored by Kaiser Family Foundation).
32. See FABRIZIO McLAUGHLIN & AssoC., PETER HART RES. Assoc., supra note 31.
33. See McLAUGHLIN & AssoC., supra note 31.

34. See supra note 31.
35. See Wright & Williams, supra note 11.
36. See Alisa Ulferts, Patients' Rights Left Out of Malpractice Debate, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Mar. 2, 2003, at 7D, available at www.lexisnexis.com: "A 14-volume report published by Gov.
Jeb Bush's task force lists myriad solutions to the crisis, but the centerpiece is a $250,000 cap on
what juries can award for pain and suffering." Id. The St. Petersburg Times published an excellent series of stories throughout 2003 chronicling the politics of the medical malpractice battle in
the Florida.
37. Alisa Ulferts, Malpractice Bill Heads to Bush, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 14, 2003, at
1A,available at www.lexisnexis.com. The cap is a per incident rather than a per defendant cap.
See FLA. STAT. § 766.118 (2003).
38. See AM. TORT REFORM FOUNDATION, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2004, http://www.atra.org/

reports/hellholes/report.pdf.
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6, 2005, reported, "Flanked by about 150 doctors, many in their familiar white office coats, Bush staked out one of the major new policy
initiatives of his second term by imploring lawmakers in Washington
to impose $250,000 limits on non-economic damages linked to medical
mistakes. ' 39 The same day, Northern Illinois University released a
press statement that began:
President George W. Bush knew in advance his campaign for
medical malpractice tort reform would play well in Madison
County, Ill., where he unveiled his plan Wednesday.
So did researchers at Northern Illinois University's Center for
Governmental Studies, whose recently completed Illinois Policy
Survey, found that residents of southern Illinois were.., the4 0group
most strongly favoring the capping of awards in such cases.
The political rhetoric surrounding civil justice reform does not advocate caps on noneconomic damages for reasons of principle.
Rather, caps are sold to the public for very practical reasons. The
rhetorical logic says that caps will lead to significantly lower malpractice insurance for physicians. This, presumably, will in turn prevent
physicians from abandoning the practice of medicine, relocating to another state, changing medical specialties, or leaving already underserved places like rural areas. These may all be legitimate policy
problems, but the connection between damage caps and insurance
rates and between damage caps and these problems remains empirically murky. 41 An influential 2003 GAO report took note of the
murky situation, saying:
39. Dave McKinney, Bush in State to Push Tort Reform, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005, at 19.
40. Press Release, Northern Illinois University, NIU Survey Finds Illinois Residents Support
Medical Malpractice Reform (Jan. 6, 2005), available at http://www.niu.edu/pubaffairs/presskits/
ips2005/malpractice.html. According to the press release, "Statewide, 67 percent of respondents
favored a cap, while in southern Illinois that percentage soared to 81 percent. In no region was
support below 60 percent." Id.
41. There is, for instance, substantial empirical literature dealing with medical malpractice
that would suggest that medical malpractice reform is unlikely to remedy many of the problems
used to justify reform. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: IMPLICATIONS OF RISING PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE (2003) [hereinafter MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE]; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM RATES (2003) [hereinafter MEDICAL

MALPRACTICE

INSURANCE].

See

also

VASANTHAKUMAR

N.

BHAT,

MEDICAL

MALPRACTICE: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS (2001); STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN,
CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM (1995); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 8;
FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACrICE (1993); NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY (1995); PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF
MALPRACTICE (1993); PAUL C. WELLER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL (1991); Daniel P.

Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, The Effects of Malpractice Pressure and Liability Reforms on
Physicians' Perceptions of Medical Care, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81 (1997); Michelle M.

Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrenceof Medical Errors: Theory and Evidencefor Malpractice

THE TEXAS TWO-STEP

2006]

Interested parties debate the impact these various measures may
have had on premium rates. However, a lack of comprehensive
data on losses at the insurance company level makes measuring the
precise impact of the measures impossible. As noted earlier, in the
vast majority of cases, existing data do not categorize losses on
claims as economic or noneconomic, so it is not possible to quantify
the impact of a cap on noneconomic damages on insurers' losses.
Similarly, it is not possible to show exactly how much a cap would
affect claim frequency or claims-handling costs. In addition, while
most claims are settled and caps apply only to trial verdicts, some
insurers and actuaries told us that limits on damages would still
have an indirect impact on settlements by limiting potential damages should the claims go to trial. But given the limitations on measuring the impact of caps on trial verdicts,
an indirect impact would
42
be even more difficult to measure.
A companion GAO study on the connection between malpractice insurance problems and access to healthcare also found a mixed picture. 43 Lucinda Finley's recent review of the efficacy of caps on
noneconomic damages comes to essentially the same conclusions as
the GAO analyses. 44 A short review we wrote ten years ago of earlier
empirical studies assessing the impact of medical malpractice reforms
45
passed in the 1970s, including caps, also noted the mixed picture.
B.

Caps and Diminishing Access to the Justice System

Regardless of whether caps actually serve the purposes laid out in
the political rhetoric, they may still diminish access to the civil justice
system for potential medical malpractice plaintiffs. While this is
something that has not yet attracted much systematic, empirical examination, the possibility that caps diminish meaningful access has been
raised. For instance, the 2003 GAO report on medical malpractice
insurance premiums noted, "[A]ccording to some trial attorneys we
spoke with, attorneys may be less likely to represent injured parties
with minor economic damages if noneconomic damages are limited."' 46 The GAO's argument is that caps on damages are, in part,
aimed at reducing the number of malpractice cases by making them
Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595 (2002); David M. Studdert et al., Beyond Dead Reckoning: Measures of Medical Injury Burden, Malpractice Litigation, and Alternative Compensation Models
from Utah and Colorado, 33 IND. L. REV. 1643 (2000).
42. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE, supra note 41, at 42-43.
43. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 41.
44. Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the Elderly,

53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1267-80 (2004).
45. DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 41, at 105-14. See also David M. Studdert et al., Medical
Malpractice, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 283, 287-88 (2004).
46. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE, supra note 41, at 42.
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less economically attractive. Jerry Van Hoy has documented how caps
on awards instituted by Indiana in the 1970s drove most plaintiffs'
lawyers out of the Indiana malpractice market altogether by making it
47
impossible for them to handle these cases profitably.
In her investigation of what she calls the "hidden victims of tort
reform," Professor Finley argues that as a result of caps, lawyers will
be less willing to take certain kinds of cases. After an empirical analysis of jury verdicts in California, Florida, and Maryland (with most
attention to California), Finley found that the primary impact of damage caps can be seen in those cases involving women, children, and the
elderly, especially in death cases involving these groups. 48 Because of
caps, these groups of people are likely to lose a larger percentage of
their compensatory damage awards compared to men of working age.
She says:
These disparate negative effects will be especially pronounced for
elderly women. A cap on noneconomic loss damages will also unduly limit recoveries in cases where the victim died as a result of the
negligent misconduct. This limitation on death recoveries will have
the greatest impact in cases where an infant or child dies; the cap
will come close to serving as a ceiling on recovery, leaving the families of dead babies shut off from seeking redress and recognition
through the tort system. Cap laws will also place an effective ceiling
on recovery for certain types of injuries disproportionately experienced by women, including sexual assault and gynecological injury,
that impair childbearing or sexual functioning. By depressing the recovery value of these injuries, lawyers will be increasingly unwilling
to take the cases of sexual assault victims, women suffering from fertility loss or loss of the ability to enjoy sexual intimacy, or
elderly
49
women victimized by neglect and abuse in nursing homes.

For Finley, the most profound consequence of caps will be on "the
fairness and equality of our civil justice system, as the effects of cap
laws send the message that women, the elderly, and the parents of
dead children should not bother to apply."' 50 The idea is that the rights
47. Jerry Van Hoy, Markets and Contingency: How Client Markets Influence the Work of
Plaintiffs' Personal Injury Lawyers, 6 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 345 (1999).

48. Finley, supra note 44, at 1313. A recent analysis of the California cap on noneconomic
damages in medical malpractice cases came to similar conclusions with regard to which groups of
people would feel the brunt of the caps. See NICHOLAS M. PACE ET AL., CAPPING NON-EcoNOMIC AWARDS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TRIALS: CALIFORNIA JURY VERDICTS UNDER

MICRA 30-33 (2004) (describing the effects of caps by age and gender of plaintiff). Another
study examining California jury verdicts, however, did not find the same effects with regard to
age and gender. This study, nonetheless, did find a disparate impact with regard to the most
severely injured people. See David Studdert et al., Are Damage Caps Regressive? A Study of
MalpracticeJury Verdicts in California, 23 HEALTH AFF. 54, 54 (2004).

49. Finley, supra note 44, at 1313 (emphasis added).
50. Id.
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one has in practice will be dependent on lawyers willing to take cases
51
involving those rights.
As if to echo Finley's concerns, a March 20, 2004 article in the
Houston Chronicle noted that "[tlhe number of medical malpractice
lawsuits filed in Harris County has fallen dramatically since Texas
lawmakers imposed a cap six months ago on the amount of money
juries can award."' 52 Similarly, a recent article in Texas Lawyer on the
connection between access and capping of noneconomic damages in
medical malpractice cases summarizes one plaintiffs' lawyer's view by
saying, "HB 4 has slammed the courthouse doors shut on those who
'53
can least afford it-children, stay-at-home moms and the elderly.
The article goes on to quote another plaintiffs' lawyer who said, "Only
those people who have an impressive earnings history and a significant earnings future have a case that is viable under H.B. 4."54 Other
lawyers are quoted as saying that they are taking fewer medical mal55
practice cases as a result of HB4.
In short, limits on noneconomic damage awards may affect access to
the civil justice system by making cases financially unattractive to
plaintiffs' lawyers working on a contingency fee basis. Access may be
51. The TIPS Task Force said "that materially limiting contingent fees ... could have a tempering effect on [malpractice insurance] premiums. The reason is simple, medical malpractice
victims will not find lawyers to assist them in their claims." CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 28.
52. Andrew Tilghman, Malpractice Filings Fall After Cap, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 20, 2004, at
A33.
53. Mark Donald, Access Denied: Does Tort Reform Close Courthouse Doors to Those Who
Can Least Afford It?, TEX. LAW., Jan. 10, 2005, at 1.

54. Id.
55. Id. Although not involving medical malpractice cases, some of our earlier work in Texas
found similar dynamics surrounding changes in noneconomic damages. We found that plaintiffs'
lawyers were handling fewer auto cases and were becoming much stricter in screening those
cases they did handle, potentially leaving some victims without meaningful access. See Daniels
& Martin, Strange Success, supra note 9. Plaintiffs' lawyers did this because of their belief that
juries were awarding less noneconomic damages in auto cases, a belief for which we found empirical support. Id. at 1245-47. The change in noneconomic damage awards was not, however, a
result of a legislatively imposed cap. Rather, in the lawyers' view, this was a result of many years
of protort reform, public relations campaigns affecting-or "poisoning"-the jury pool. According to a Lubbock, Texas, judge and mediator interviewed as a part of the Texas Department of
Insurance 1998 rate reduction process, "I don't think that you can say tort reform gets direct
credit. I think the propaganda associated with the tort reform and the poisoning of the jury
panels had effect on bringing things [jury verdicts] down." Texas Department of Insurance, Selected Quotations from Focus Group Sessions (1998), http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/commish/legal/
lctortqu.html. The idea of "poisoned" jury pools has been seen as a national problem. For
instance, a 1997 article in Trial complained of "an environment charged with 'tort reform' rhetoric,
where potential jurors come to court already influenced by deliberate propaganda aimed at
discrediting plaintiffs and their lawyers ...." James L. Gilbert et al., Overcoming Juror Bias in
Voir Dire, TRIAL, July 1997, at 42. If this informal change involving noneconomic damage
awards can diminish access, we would certainly expect formal caps to produce the same result.

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:635

diminished because the only way for most people to afford representation, especially in a substantial matter like medical malpractice, is to
hire a lawyer who will handle it on a contingency fee basis. As Herbert Kritzer reminds us, the contingency fee is about access to the
system for those without the means to pay a lawyer to represent
them.56 Plaintiffs' lawyers are the gatekeepers to the civil justice system. 57 As Kritzer says, "from the perspective of the average citizen,
contingency fees are about 'access to justice' through the mechanism
of civil litigation, or the threat of civil litigation. 5 8s A Texas lawyer we
recently interviewed said the same thing, noting:
ninety percent of the people out there make their living, they pay
for their kids to go to school, they pay to take care of their kids,
they pay for their mortgage, they pay for their one or two cars, and
at the end of the month, they may have $100 left over if they're the
lucky ones.... And so, for someone to have the ability to go hire a
lawyer on59anything other than a contingency, you know, I think it's
a fiction.
A 1993 analysis of the use of lawyers in closed medical malpractice
claims in Wisconsin starkly shows the importance of legal representation.60 Of the 2,896 closed claims in the study, fifty-nine involved pro
61
se plaintiffs, and another 102 involved unrepresented plaintiffs.
Claimants were able to secure a monetary settlement in only one of
the fifty-nine pro se claims (a success rate of 1.7%), and in eight of the
other 102 claims (a success rate of 7.8%). In contrast, the success rate
for claimants represented by counsel was thirty-four percent. Interestingly, the success rate for claimants represented by the two most
experienced plaintiffs' firms in the study-the specialists handling 100
or more claims among the 2,896-was 50.2% (56.1% and 46.4%, respectively). 62 In other words, representation makes a difference and
the best representation can make a substantial difference.
Imposing caps that make cases financially unattractive can also affect access to the justice system in another way. The referral system
may be affected, especially with regard to moving more complex and
higher value cases to the specialists. Indeed, many high-end plaintiffs'
56. See KRITZER, supra note 18, at 254.
57. For a discussion on the importance of lawyers for success in a medical malpractice case,
see Stephen Daniels et al., Why Kill All the Lawyers? Repeat Players and Strategic Advantage on
Medical Malpractice Claims (Am. B. Found., Working Paper No. 9210, 1993).
58. KRITZER, supra note 18, at 254.

59. Unless otherwise noted, all Texas lawyers quoted in this article are among those we interviewed. See supra note 9.
60. See Daniels et al., supra note 57.
61. Id. at 6.
62. Id. at 20.
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lawyers rely heavily on lawyer referrals as a source of business, so
much so that some have developed a network of lawyers from whom
63
they regularly receive referrals and to whom a fee is typically paid.
Legal changes that affect profitability may discourage lawyers from
making or accepting referrals. Changes that make cases the specialists
handle less profitable can disrupt the referral system because there
will be less money from which the specialist can recover his or her
time and expenses, and less to pay the referring lawyer the usual fee
(typically about one-third of the specialist's fee). Changes that make
cases the referring lawyers handle less profitable can disrupt the system by making it harder for these lawyers to stay in business. If they
cannot stay in business, there will be no one to refer cases to the specialists. 64 As one lawyer we interviewed, who relied almost exclusively on lawyer referrals, bluntly stated, "If my referring lawyers go
away, I'm in trouble." Consequently, access to the most able and appropriate lawyers may be diminished.
C. Caps as an Instrument for Change in the Law's Development
Diminishing access is a direct or immediate consequence of imposing caps that make certain cases financially unattractive. But the indirect consequences may be equally important, especially with regard to
high-end or elite plaintiffs' lawyers-the specialists. Marc Galanter
and David Luban, in a 1993 article dealing with punitive damages,
outlined a rough theoretical argument about the substantial impact of
formal tort reform on the plaintiffs' bar and eventually on the civil
justice system. 65 As we read their argument, it is based on the presumption that tort reform is aimed at making a contingency-fee-based
practice less profitable. The direct and most obvious consequences of
tort reform, Galanter and Luban said, involve plaintiffs' lawyers handling fewer tort cases or leaving the market altogether-or the jurisdiction-especially the high-end or elite plaintiffs' lawyers. This
would mean less opportunity for people to enforce the protections of
tort law because there would be fewer lawyers working in this field.
Consequently, the law's purposes may not be served.
63. This discussion draws from Daniels & Martin, Darwinism,supra note 9, at 394-96.
64. This in fact happened in Texas in the wake of the 1991 changes in the handling of workers'
compensation cases which drove most lawyers out of this practice area. Id. These lawyers were
a regular source of referrals for a number of high-end plaintiffs' lawyers. Id. High-end lawyers,
in turn, saw their practices suffer because they relied so heavily on referrals from the workers'
compensation lawyers. Id.
65. Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42
AM. U. L. REV. 1393 (1993).
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Galanter and Luban believe that the high-end or elite lawyers are
most likely to leave the market because they have the resources and
skills to seek other lucrative opportunities. 66 Less proficient lawyers
will be the ones left working in the field. This could mean, Galanter
and Luban say, fewer top-notch lawyers devising novel legal strategies
that extend the law. 6 7 It would also diminish the networks among
plaintiffs' lawyers through which new ideas and innovations circulate. 68 To the extent such lawyers act as mentors for new lawyers entering the field, the opportunities for apprenticeship training would be
fewer, diminishing the overall quality of the plaintiffs' bar.69 The
quality of the plaintiffs' bar would be further diminished, they say, by
the less proficient lawyers who will move into the market as the better
70
ones leave.
In addition, Galanter and Luban argued that the most skilled plaintiffs' lawyers
typically obtain the best settlements, not only because they are better-than-average negotiators, but also because defendants do not
want to confront them in jury trials. Most cases settle out of court,
and information about the size of settlements is often disseminated
among both the plaintiffs' and defense bars. This information sends
signals that govern negotiations in future cases because settlement
negotiations occur "in the shadow" of past settlements. If too many
good lawyers exit the plaintiffs' bar, the shadow shortens, and71 defendants will be able to bargain harder for lower settlements.
In other words, it may be possible to affect change in the law itself-in
practice-by altering the market for certain services. Caps are a powerful instrument for altering the market.
III.

DAMAGE CAPS AND THE BUSINESS OF PLAINTIFFS' LAW

Plaintiffs' lawyers are specialists. They devote most, if not all, of
their practices to representing individuals suffering some kind of injury and do so on a contingency fee basis. Theirs is a precarious business, and damage caps make that business even more so. Plaintiffs'
lawyers typically deal with "one shot" clients for whose injuries the
law potentially provides compensation. They must generate an ongoing stream of such clients in order to survive financially. Identifying
those matters that are likely to lead to an adequate level of compensa66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 1452-53.
Id.
Id.
Id.

70. Id.

71. Galanter & Luban, supra note 65, at 1453-54.
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tion and handling them with some degree of cost effectiveness is crucial. 72 If a case is not successful (meaning there is no compensation),
the lawyer will receive no fee and will not be reimbursed for the expenses incurred in preparing the case.
Merely being successful, however, may not be enough. The lawyer
may still face financial problems if the compensation awarded is not
sufficient to cover both the client's needs and the lawyer's investment
of time and money. In other words, a lawyer can "win" a case but still
lose financially. In addition, lawyers must weigh opportunity costsweighing risks and costs against likely return in choosing among contingency fee cases and weighing contingency fee cases against less
73
risky hourly or flat fee cases.
Drawing from our empirical research in Texas, the first section of
Part III provides a general outline of the precarious business of practicing plaintiffs' law. It forms the context for the second section of
Part III, which examines plaintiffs' lawyers who specialize even further into healthcare-related areas directly targeted by Texas's recent
capping of noneconomic damages. Finally, the last section of Part III
draws from the Texas Referral Survey and looks at the referral
system.
A.

The Business of Plaintiffs' Law: A General Picture

Maintaining a steady stream of clients with injuries that the civil
justice system will adequately compensate is everything for plaintiffs'
lawyers. Without such a stream of clients, they will quickly be out of
business. How do they maintain that steady stream of clients with
compensable injuries? How do they screen cases? These are crucial
issues since "adequate compensation" means compensation that will
allow the lawyer to collect his or her fee and recoup his or her investment in the matter without shortchanging the client. This definition is
essential in understanding the potential impact of caps on
noneconomic damages.
In light of the frequently aired television commercials offering legal
services in Texas and elsewhere, the assumption might be that most
plaintiffs' lawyers get their clients through advertising and take almost
everything that comes in the door. In reality, this is far from true. Of
the 549 plaintiffs' lawyers in our Plaintiffs' Lawyer Survey who responded to a question on advertising, 70.1% said they advertise. 74 As
72. See KRITZER, supra note 18, at 67-88, on screening by lawyers in Wisconsin.
73. See id. at 180-218, for a discussion of Wisconsin lawyers' return on investment in cases.
74. Of those who did advertise (n=385), the most frequently used vehicle was the Yellow Pages
(77.7%). Plaintiffs' Lawyers Survey, supra note 9. For 37.1% of the advertisers, this was the
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Table 1 shows, however, advertising is not the key source of clients for
the lawyers in the survey, even for those who do advertise. It shows
that referrals of one kind or another are the key source of business,
with lawyer referrals being the most important source of clients, followed by client referrals, other referrals, and advertising (all forms
combined). The relative unimportance of advertising as a source of
clients for most respondents is reflected in the fact that only 9.6% of
respondents received at least fifty percent of their clients from
advertising.
TABLE 1
SOURCES OF CLIENTS FOR PLAINTIFFS' LAWYERS

(Texas Plaintiffs' Lawyer Survey)
Source

Mean Percent of Clients

Median Percent of Clients

Lawyer Referrals (n=540)
Client Referrals (n=539)
Other Referrals (n=539)
Advertising (n=539)
All Other (n=540)

37.2%
28.9%
12.8%
12.3%
6.3%

30.0%
25.0%
5.0%
0
0

The importance of referrals as a source of business is a key to understanding the impact of caps on plaintiffs' lawyers' practices. This is
so, regardless of the referral source, because referral business is based
on a lawyer's reputation for getting good results and treating clients
fairly. 75 A key part of this includes not shortchanging the award the
client receives in order for the lawyer to get all of his or her fee.
Plaintiffs' lawyers loathe reducing the return to the client so that the
lawyer comes out ahead financially. This is a sure way to lose business
in what is a competitive marketplace. A number of lawyers we interviewed said that, if need be, they would reduce their fees in this situation. One lawyer said, "service to your client is real important ... we
will reduce our attorneys fees to help a client." The same logic applies
to cases that also involve a fee to a referring lawyer. If a lawyer shortonly advertising they did. Id. The second most frequently used vehicle was the Internet, used by
31.4% of those who advertise. Id. Television was used much less frequently. Id. Only 14.5% of
those who advertise used television, essentially the same percentage that used mailings to other
lawyers-14.8%. Mail to other lawyers is a way to generate the referral of cases. Id.
75. See Daniels & Martin, Darwinism, supra note 9, on the importance of reputation. See also
KRITZER, supra note 18, at 66-67. Kritzer stated:
Contingency fee lawyers want their clients to leave satisfied with the result the lawyer
obtained on their behalf; more important, the lawyers want the clients to stay satisfied.
A lawyer who settles cases too cheaply will have trouble maintaining the reputation
necessary to create the flow of potential clients that is in the lawyer's long-term
interest.
Id. at 67.
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changes his or her referring lawyers, the referring lawyer will take his
or her business elsewhere and suggest that other referring lawyers do
the same. Limiting damages makes it harder for the lawyer to make a
profit unless the lawyer is willing to risk his or her reputation by shortchanging the client or the referring lawyer.
Regardless of how clients are obtained, plaintiffs' lawyers must
choose cases with some care. A practice that uncritically takes all
comers-a practice made up of a large proportion of problematic or
frivolous cases-is one that will certainly be short-lived. The lawyer
must be able to identify those cases with adequate liability and a reasonable chance of obtaining a level of compensation sufficient for the
client while still covering the lawyer's fee and expenses. Plaintiffs'
lawyers, perhaps contrary to the assumptions of some, are generally
rather choosey. The Plaintiffs' Lawyer Survey revealed that respondents' firms signed only 25.4% of the calls received by the entire firm
in the typical month to a contingency fee contract. When the survey
asked about just the individual respondent (rather than the respondent's entire firm) with regard to calls signed to a contract, the percentage signed to a contract was 26.7%.
These figures tell us how important screening is for plaintiffs' lawyers. A hypothetical posed in the Plaintiffs' Lawyer Survey along with
what we learned in our interviews provide important insight into the
screening process. The Plaintiffs' Lawyer Survey asked lawyers
whether they would take a straightforward, low-value auto accident
case involving only soft tissue injuries worth $3,000, minimal property
damage, and liability that appeared to run to another party who was
adequately insured. It is the kind of case one might expect any lawyer
to take, but only 42.7% of respondents said they would take the case
at the time of the survey. When asked if they would have taken the
same case five years earlier, of the 455 lawyers who were in practice
five years prior and who answered the question, 75.2% said they
would have taken the case. The difference was a perceived change in
the market for these cases caused by the tort reform public relations
campaigns that made these cases worth much less-particularly with
76
regard to noneconomic damages.
A number of the lawyers we interviewed offered some sense of why
lawyers might hesitate to take such a case. In their view, juries have
become more "antiplaintiff" as a result of tort reform public relations
campaigns. In turn, insurance companies were getting tougher with
respect to settlement in the latter 1990s. As a result, the lawyers said
76. See Daniels & Martin, Strange Success, supra note 9, at 1245-47.
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they needed to be more careful in deciding which cases they chose to
handle. Cost effectiveness was extremely important. As one lawyer
simply stated: "we're getting increasingly selective because the process
of taking a case to court is getting enormously expensive,.... I front all
the costs and if we lose, I eat the costs."
A San Antonio lawyer explained why he was "very selective" with
these cases:
Low impact, soft tissue cases, we're very selective with because the
insurance companies are not paying for those cases [and] juries are
not giving monies for those cases ....

goes in with that type of case,
person that's only there for the
there's a very good chance that
achieve your full fee as per the

In today's climate, if someone

they're automatically cast out as a
money, regardless of the injury...
you're just
not going to be able to
contract. 77

Even one of Texas's high-volume practices was tightening its
screening:
There are some [requirements] that we have modified in the last
couple of years. The physical amount of damage that the person has
on their vehicle, as well as the quickness with which they have
sought medical treatment. So we do have parameters in place.
We've probably gotten stricter over the last two years just because
of the changes in tort reform.
A third lawyer made the direct connection to noneconomic damages:
I mean, when I look at these [jury] verdict reports, and I see that a
jury found the defendant was in a car wreck-100% negligent-the
defendant ran a stop sign and hurt somebody, and they award
$6,742 in property damages to the plaintiff and they award $1,192.50
in medical bills, zero pain and suffering, zero mental anguish, zero
disability, zero physical impairment, you know, whatever. I look at
that like, good God, what have we come to? . . . They didn't give a
shit, you know. ... There are people on juries now [who say], "I

couldn't award anything for pain and mental anguish."... So, that's
the biggest problem I see, it's just in attitudes.
These comments demonstrate why lawyers would be hesitant to
take the case in our hypothetical. Soft tissue injury auto accident
cases are not very cost effective because the cost of handling them is
increasing, awards are decreasing in general, and noneconomic damage awards are decreasing in particular. As a result, lawyers are handling fewer of these cases. In short, the comments on auto cases
suggest that anything that effectively limits damages-and thereby
77. Another lawyer we interviewed noted: "there was a time in my practice where my policy
was that if it was clear liability and if there was an insurance that I would take any car wreck case
...I don't take any of those low-impact car wreck cases with soft tissue injuries [anymore]."
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limits contingency fees-may have consequences for access to the civil
justice system.
As one might expect, the screening gets more intense as the costs
involved in a case increase. In our interviews, we found that plaintiffs'
lawyers who have modest practices invested more in screening the few
larger cases that came into their offices-the cases that could make
the difference between a break-even year and a profitable one. A
lawyer who occasionally handled both medical malpractice and products liability cases that were not too large or complex described his
approach to screening:
[For medical malpractice] we have a nurse and several doctors that
we have available to us on a contract basis .... They screen every
case that comes into the office. Especially in the medical negligence
cases, we go through two or three different screenings to make sure
that they are the type of case that will be cost effective and in the
end will yield a positive result. On the products cases, we have a
better feel but even there we've got to be very careful. We have to
have a very serious injury for both cases, but for products cases
that's one of the very first requirements. For example, I don't take
... let's say an aerosol can that is defective and explodes and blows
away somebody's finger. That's not worth taking unless it's a little
girl or small child. But if it's an adult, it's just not cost effective. ...
You have to realize that in today's climate every case that you take,
there's a ninety-five percent chance it will have to be tried to a jury.
Our philosophy is we never take a case for settlement purposes because that's a good way to lose a lot of money, lose your time and to
have a very unhappy client at the end.
The process for screening lower-value cases is different, but the key
issue is still the level of damages.
No prospective client even comes into this lawyer's office unless the
initial telephone screening shows some potential for damages. That
initial screening focuses on the level of injury and on the person involved. Because of the overhead this lawyer carries-four lawyers
(himself included) and ten staff members-there must be some kind
of substantial injury to justify accepting the case. By this he means no
soft tissue injuries (like the injuries in the hypothetical). He tends to
refer those cases to younger lawyers he knows who are just beginning
to practice, and his reason for doing so illustrates the balancing of the
cost involved and the potential award. He said, "They [younger lawyers] are willing to take those cases. Their overhead is not as high as
mine, so they can cost effectively handle those cases knowing the outcome will be lower because it cost less for them to put the cases
together."
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Equally important for this lawyer's screening process is the potential client. He said,
[Jiust across the board the credibility of your client is ever, ever
more important in these times. You have to have a client that has a
good work history, a client that has never been in trouble with the
law. Those things make for a cost effective case. That's not to say
that someone that's been in jail or has been convicted of a felony
doesn't deserve to be handled by my office, but going in we knowand those are very standard questions for us-going in we know
that that person is going to have to give some ground or that case
will never be resolved. Or if it is tried it's going to be lost or severely, severely compromised. .

.

. So those are the cost effective

things that we look at.
Even where a potential client lives becomes a part of the calculation:
I try to shy away from clients that are out of state or that have lived
in two or three cities while they're treating. Because that means a
lot of travel for us, and we've got to bill for the travel: overnight
stays, doctors in different cities, court reporters in different cities to
gather the evidence that we'll need for trial.
Such charges would have to be deducted from the award the client
receives. If there is no award, these additional costs will be losses absorbed by the lawyer.
The potential impact of limited noneconomic damage awards can
also be seen in a lawyer's sensitivity regarding how to handle a case
once he or she decides to take it. Costs are again an important factor
for the lawyer. For instance, even what seems to be a relatively
strong, straightforward case may not be one worth taking to trial. In
our interviews, many lawyers talked of what were once considered
"slam dunk" cases in which noneconomic damages would almost always be awarded, like rear-end collisions. These were cases they
would have readily taken to trial in the past. Not so today because
juries now award minimal damages or find in favor of the defendant in
such cases.
The following quote from a San Antonio lawyer illustrates how a
successful case that goes to trial may not be adequate:
[Y]ou can heat up a case where ...

let's put it hypothetically, let's

say you've got a $1,000 worth of damage to your car.... Say you've
got $3,000 worth of medical and all of a sudden the insurance company says we'll give $4,500. Well, you figure that out, nobody's going to come out alright [it will not cover all the "costs" plus the
usual contingency fee]. So you end up filing a lawsuit and if you
figure you have to try that case, you're going to spend another
$2,000 or $3,000 just proving your case. You know by the time you
pay your court reporters, you know $400 or $500, you pay your doctor a thousand or $1,500 . . . well then the next thing you know
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you've got $3,000 worth of medical and $3,000 worth of expenses
actually on the case. And if the jury comes back and says, okay, I'll
just give you your medical, you're screwed, you know. And so those
are the problems that you run into when you file a lawsuit.
The lawyer is "screwed" because there will not be enough money for
the client and for the lawyers. Again, because of the importance of
referrals as a source of business, plaintiffs' lawyers avoid reducing the
return to the client so that the lawyer comes out ahead financially.
The impact of diminished awards is aggravated by the increasing
amount of time it takes to resolve claims. A reasonable, but not high,
verdict may still mean financial problems for the plaintiffs' lawyer because he or she is spending more time on each case to get the same
fee. As one Fort Worth lawyer stated: "I spend more time on discovery. [These cases are] more time-intensive for the same case you had
five years ago." This time factor means that there will be a longer
period before any money is coming back into the firm. The lawyer
continued, "I mean, it's your money that's sitting out there ....

It's

kind of static." He sees this as a deliberate strategy on the part of the
insurance companies who "want to put as much financial pressure on
the plaintiffs' bar as possible ....

If you can't settle cases during the

year to keep your cash flow in the black, it makes it very difficult."
In light of the way in which plaintiffs' lawyers obtain, screen, and
handle cases, we can see something of the general impact that caps on
noneconomic damages can have. Awards would be diminished with a
cap, as would the lawyer's ability to collect the entire fee and recoup
the expenses put into the case. This, in turn, may lead lawyers to take
fewer cases, to be even more careful in screening cases they do take,
and to alter the way they handle the cases they do take. The result
may be that lawyers will not take meritorious but less potentially prof78
itable cases.
The next section examines those plaintiffs' lawyers who might be
directly affected by the recent Texas cap on noneconomic damages in
healthcare cases. Specifically, we will focus on those lawyers who are
medical malpractice specialists.
B.

Medical Malpractice Specialists

Of the 541 lawyers in the Plaintiffs' Lawyer Survey who responded
to a question on the kinds of cases they handled, forty-six lawyers
(8.5%) reported that fifty percent or more of their business involved
78. This has already happened in Texas with regard to auto accident cases in the absence of a
cap. See Daniels & Martin, Strange Success, supra note 9, at 1245-47.
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medical malpractice claims. 79 Because this number is low, our discussion in this section will be somewhat speculative, but there is still
much to be learned about the potential impact of noneconomic damages caps on access by examining these lawyers' views. To add depth
to the survey results, we will also draw from the interviews of plaintiffs' lawyers we conducted in Texas.
We will discuss two matters in this section of Part III. First, we will
discuss the importance of the screening process for medical malpractice specialists. This process shows us the balancing these lawyers
must do between the substantial costs of handling medical malpractice
cases on the one hand and the potential level of damages on the other.
Given the costs involved, a lawyer who does not adequately strike that
balance will soon be out of business. Building on the discussion of
screening, we will next explore the possible effects of the Texas damage cap on these specialists.
1.

Screening Cases

In section C, we will discuss in detail the importance of referrals as
a source of business for medical malpractice specialists. Before doing
so, we will begin the discussion of screening by first looking at Table 2
and what it tells us about referrals. We do so here because it shows
that on average over half of malpractice lawyers' clients come from
lawyer referrals.8 0 This makes referral fees a crucial cost factor for
medical malpractice specialists in an already costly line of work. In
many situations, these fees may be among the highest costs, if not the
highest, and they are always in the background of the screening process. In deciding whether to take a case referred by another attorney,
the specialist must take this substantial cost into consideration, and it
means that the specialist must be very careful in screening cases.

79. The Texas cap also applies to nursing home cases, but there were only three respondents
in our survey who reported that fifty percent or more of their business was in nursing home
cases. None of the three was among the forty-six medical malpractice specialists. Of the fortysix medical malpractice specialists, the mean percentage of medical malpractice cases was 77.3%,
with a median of 80.0%. Twenty-eight of the forty-six had seventy-five percent or more of their
business in medical malpractice, fifteen had ninety percent or more, and eight had one hundred
percent.
80. In contrast, Table 1 showed that for all respondents in the Plaintiffs' Lawyer Survey,
37.2% of clients came from lawyer referrals.
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2

SOURCES OF CLIENTS FOR MALPRACTICE LAWYERS (N=44)

(Texas Plaintiffs' Lawyer Survey)
Source

Mean Percent of Clients

Median Percent of Clients

Lawyer Referrals
Client Referrals
Other Referrals
Advertising
All Other

57.8%
20.6%
7.4%
10.9%
3.0%

60.0%
10.0%
0
0
0

In the Plaintiffs' Lawyers Survey, the percentage of calls signed to a
contract by medical malpractice specialists is very low (11.1% for
firms and 13.0% for individuals), lower than the percentage for all
plaintiffs' lawyers (25.4% for firms and 26.7% for individuals). The
survey did not specifically ask medical malpractice specialists what
percentage of medical malpractice matters they actually accepted.
Our interviews, however, do give us a sense that these specialists take
a very small percentage of the malpractice matters that come to
them-usually less than ten percent, and even lower for some.
The reasons for taking so few cases are easy to understand-medical malpractice cases are very hard to prove and expensive to properly
prepare. These cases are also expensive to screen. The lawyers we
interviewed routinely indicated that an initial outlay of at least $10,000
was needed for experts to determine whether to take a case or not,
and this figure did not include anyone's time in the lawyer's firm. This
means that medical malpractice specialists may spend thousands of
dollars in deciding not to take a case-money they will not get back.
It is a part of the overhead for this kind of practice that must be covered by the successful cases.
The importance of costs is highlighted by the fact that many plaintiffs' attorneys will not take a medical malpractice case, especially a
complex one. Of the 541 lawyers in the Plaintiffs' Lawyer Survey who
responded to a question on the cases they handled, over half (54.5%)
said they handled no medical malpractice cases and for another onethird (32.9%) medical malpractice made up less than twenty-five percent of their practice. For instance, one Houston lawyer with a substantial litigation practice said,
We don't take any medical malpractice cases, [we refer them].
Number one, they are way too technical for our expertise .... They
are also very, very expensive to handle. Easily you can spend
$100,000 without blinking on those kinds of cases and typically we
don't have that kind of cash lying around. We don't have the contacts with the experts in those kinds of fields. So it's just not something that we do and probably won't ever.
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We recently interviewed this lawyer again, and he has not changed his
mind about medical malpractice cases.
Some medical malpractice specialists internalize a part of the cost of
screening by having one or more nurses or nurse-lawyers on staff or
even by having a physician-lawyer on staff. For instance, one specialist said,
I have two nurses that work here full-time and every case that
comes in the office, every call that comes in, is run by one of the
nurses to see if it is a case that would even get someone's attention
and that we would spend our time to investigate it. And then if it
does that, we will get some medical records.
Another lawyer's screening system is extensive:
We have nine lawyers now that do almost nothing but medical
malpractice. Two of our lawyers are doctor-lawyers; one is a nurselawyer; we have three nurse-paralegals. Any .ime anybody makes a
call

. . .

they're going to talk to a nurse-paralegal, they're not going

to talk to a lawyer. The nurse-paralegal gets that call and screens
that call. A large number of those calls, the nurse-paralegal tells
them over the phone that what they're describing is not medical
malpractice. They may be mad at their doctor, you know, because
they looked at them the wrong way or pinched them the wrong way.
Or a frequent thing is that somebody went in for back surgery and
they are not any better after the back surgery. Those things are not
medical malpractice. So those are screened out over the phone. If
the nurse-paralegal thinks that the case sounds like it may potentially have merit, then she will either on her own or after consulting
with one of the doctor-lawyers get a medical authorization from the
potential client and get the medical records to review.
We don't take a contract first and then obtain the records and
review them. We don't want to take a contract and give a client the
sense of hope unless we know what the case is about, we've analyzed it, believe it will be a successful case. So the medical records
are obtained and then the normal process is that those records are
going to be reviewed by one of the nurse-paralegals and by one of
the MD-JDs, and then either the records themselves or those initial
reviews are going to be reviewed by the senior MD-JD and it's going to be reviewed by me. And then we meet once a month, what
we call our nonlitigation meeting; in any given month we're going to
have seventy or eighty cases under consideration for the ones we're
going to take. We talk about all of them. There has to be an agreement from the medical side and from my side, the legal side of it,
that we're going to pursue that case-that not only is the medicine
favorable in terms of we believe that there has been a medical screw
up but that we can find an expert that will say that, or we've already
found an expert that will say that. At that point, we will have done
research through Medline and the medical journals and the medical
texts, and we will have medical literature that says what was wrong.
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And then I look at it from a damages standpoint, a venue standpoint, an economic standpoint. Only if we agree on all of that and
basically... everybody in the room reaches agreement, do we then
decide we're going to then get the client in and sign the client up.
With such an investment in firm infrastructure, it is easy to see why
this lawyer has a minimum of one million dollars in potential damages
as a threshold for cases he will take. The successful cases have to help
pay for this overhead.
As this example shows, the screening process focuses on both damages and liability, but damages are ultimately the most important factor for most lawyers. This is not to say that liability is ignored; but in
balancing damages against liability, low damages will weigh more
heavily than good liability. As one malpractice specialist stated,
[O]f course in the med-mal area you're obviously interested in damages because these cases are so expensive that you can't afford, I
mean you have to have some kind of a damages screening criteria.
Although I don't have any hard and fast rule like some law firms,
it's got to have a settlement value of $500,000 or a million or more,
or whatever. I look at things like severity and permanency of the
injury. I look at, if it's a death case, the age of the individual,
whether they were employed and whether they were working or
able to work.
Another lawyer's remarks are fairly representative of what we were
told. He said, "I don't take a med-mal case, and I think that most
people don't take a med-mal case, unless there is a pretty serious injury involved." There must be enough recovery potential to pay for
the costs of screening the case, the costs of preparing the case, the
costs of actually litigating the case, the cost of the lawyer's time, and
possibly the cost of the referral fee. On top of this, there must be
enough recovery to help pay for the costs of screening all of the cases
ultimately rejected by the lawyer, as well as other parts of the lawyer's
overhead.
The importance of damages is illustrated by the consensus of a
number of lawyers who explained that they would not take a low
value medical malpractice case even if there was obvious malpractice.
One specialist provided the following example to make the point:
For example, I had a case today, that called in and a doctor left a
tube in their stomach [after surgery].... The guy was fine, the guy
was doing well-he just felt like it was malpractice ....

I explained

to him that it probably was malpractice, but if he is fine and dandy,
then there is no problem. They opened him up and took the tube
out and he's fine. There is hardly any way economically to pursue a
medical malpractice case such that in the end I will have a happy
client. We will pursue the claim and then all the money will have
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gone for court reporters and doctors' expenses and testifying and
things of that nature.
In the end, the client will wind up with little or nothing if the case
value is too low, and an unhappy client is bad for business. Similarly,
another lawyer said, "we don't take [low value medical malpractice
cases] because the damages may not be of a size that we can dedicate
the office forces to handling that kind of case. You just can't stop the
world and handle a $25,000 malpractice case. You just can't do it."81
This lawyer estimated that his firm spends at least $60,000 for out of
pocket expenses in a malpractice case (this does not include anyone's
82
time).
The potential impact of stringent caps on noneconomic damage
awards is easy to see in the context of how choosey plaintiffs' lawyers
are with regard to medical malpractice cases, assuming that they will
even take on such a case. In contrast, a relatively high cap-over one
million dollars-may not have a substantial impact since there could
still be enough money to ensure that the client's needs are met and the
lawyer's contingency fee and out of pocket expenses are covered. If
the cap is set low, like the $250,000 cap in Texas, the impact could be
significant because it would be much harder for the lawyer to come
out ahead (depending on the kind of malpractice case) without shortchanging the client or the referring lawyer (if there is one). Given the
importance of referrals as a source of business for medical malpractice
specialists-both lawyer and client referrals-neither option is
tenable.
The main point of the discussion of screening is a simple one-the
specialists are interested only in the very best cases. The remarks of a
Dallas lawyer offer a very good, succinct summary. He said, "the really successful ones [medical malpractice specialists] now are only interested in the cases that involve catastrophic damages. They won't
81. According to the TIPS Task Force, "Information provided to the Task Force suggests that
a medical malpractice claim must amount to $100[,000]-200,000 simply to break even. Anything
less means that ... the case will be refused." CARROLL ET AL., supra note 7, at 32.
82. Still, we found one lawyer among those we interviewed who at one time would take a
lower value malpractice case, but only if the malpractice is obvious. A Houston lawyer interviewed before the 2003 tort reforms who handles million-dollar-plus malpractice cases said he
had
a couple of malpractice cases that are worth maybe $20,000 or $25,000 [at the time of
the interview] ....
Well, you know, when you leave something in somebody and another procedure is going to remove it and you aren't going to have any permanent
problems, it's a $20,000 to $25,000 case, but it takes a few letters to get it done.
But, he took these cases only after an initial review by the firm's own physician-lawyer and a
review of the records that showed that the malpractice was clearly obvious. When asked after
the imposition of the 2003 cap on noneconomic damages if he would take such a case, the answer
was a definite no.
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talk to anybody else." He continued, "They will not take a case unless
83
it is a lead pipe cinch and involves catastrophic damages."
2.

The Impact on Medical Malpractice Specialists

All of the lawyers we have recently interviewed agree that medical
malpractice cases will be less attractive financially because of the new
Texas cap on noneconomic damages, with the greatest impact on cases
involving women, the elderly, single people with no dependents, and
children. These are Lucinda Finley's "hidden victims" of tort reform.
Most simply, as one lawyer said, "It limits your ability to take cases
where you don't have large economic losses.. . and medical malpractice cases are still expensive to pursue ....
None of the changes in
HB4 did anything to lower the litigation cost to the plaintiff." He
went on to say that regardless of the cap,
doctors still charge several thousand dollars to review a case, several
thousand dollars to write reports and testify in cases ... and then
you have routine litigation expenses: the cost of depositions, the
cost of gathering records. If you're gonna have other experts like
vocational experts or economists, then you're gonna hafta pay them
too.
Consequently, it is difficult to take a case and make a profit when
damages are severely limited. A major medical malpractice specialist
said,
[I]f you have a capped case that is going to take $100,000 to [litigate], you cannot justify the time, effort and expense of litigation for
the chance of getting a client a recovery of $40,000-$50,000. It
doesn't make any sense and I don't recommend it to people .... I
unfortunately have that conversation almost weekly with somebody,
explaining [that] in [a] capped environment they just don't have a
way to make a case given the expense that potentially would be
involved for a risky recovery.
In his estimation, echoing Finley's arguments about the "hidden victims" of tort reform, "they essentially closed the courthouse door to
the negligence that would kill a child, a housewife or an elderly person." The reason is that "there are no medical expenses, no loss of
earning capacity, and unless it's drop-dead negligence that you can
prosecute with one or two experts, that's just not a case that I think in
Texas right now is a viable case."
While the cap may have its greatest impact on malpractice cases
involving certain groups of people, it may also have an impact on
medical malpractice cases generally. Because the economics of han83. Note that catastrophic damages means economic damages. Cases involving Lucinda Finley's "hidden victims" of tort reform will not often fit the bill.
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dling malpractice cases has changed with the cap, greater emphasis
must be placed on the amount of economic damages recoverable in
any kind of malpractice case. This means looking for cases with
higher damage potential. Some types of cases will still be economically attractive, like birth trauma cases in which the baby survives. In
one specialist's view,
[T]here's a lot of medical malpractice that can still be viable. Certainly, birth trauma cases are viable cases. Orthopedic or anesthesia
cases that have led to permanent impairment with a wage earner,
and it doesn't even have to be a high wage earner.., but you've got
to really be able to create some loss of earning capacity to justify
potential recovery outside of simply the intangible damages.
Still, we are beginning to see medical malpractice specialists in
Texas looking to reorient their practices in some way. Some are moving out of the market altogether and looking into other areas of contingency fee work, like business litigation. This may be extreme, but it
seems that few specialists will be handling as many medical malpractice cases as before. One specialist we interviewed, both before and
after Texas's 2003 changes, said that his practice used to consist of
over ninety percent medical malpractice, but that ratio has fallen to
sixty percent. He continued, "After this year, as we've worked
through the cases that were filed before [the cap took effect], I would
say we're closer to 60/40, sixty percent still being med-mal and forty
percent more general personal injury."
Interestingly, this lawyer does not think that the number of calls
coming to his office on medical malpractice cases will decrease, but
rather that the proportion his firm will accept will decrease. The firm
is "absolutely more selective" in the screening process, he said, because of the cap on noneconomic damages. His remarks clearly reflect the key point regarding the connection between the damage cap
and access. Medical errors and medical negligence will not go away or
lessen in the wake of the cap, but potentially legitimate malpractice
claims will not be pursued because of the cap.
Another specialist is also looking at reducing medical malpractice to
about sixty percent of his business, with the remaining forty percent
being other personal injury, "Well, I'd still like to keep med-mal as my
primary area of practice ... hopefully over sixty percent ... but sixty
percent med-mal and forty percent other personal injury would probably be about right." He said, "We are now looking at other kinds of
personal injury cases. Car wrecks, products [liability] and nonsubscriber cases [non-workers' compensation work injury], which I
wouldn't have even looked at before HB4." He too will screen more
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strictly, "I think you have to be really, really careful about what cases
you take, how much money you spend on those cases ... there's always been an economic decision in whether you take a case or not.
But it's just now become a little bit more critical."
Journalistic accounts also suggest that access for injured people may
become more difficult in the malpractice area. Indeed, a Texas Lawyer article from January 2005 carried the title Access Denied: Does
Tort Reform Close CourthouseDoors to Those Who Can Least Afford
It?84 The story quoted one well-known malpractice specialist in Dallas as saying, "My office has only taken two new med-mal cases since
H.B. 4 became effective [on September 1, 2003] . . . Before the
change in the law, we would have taken in 30 to 40 cases over the
same time period. ' 85 Another lawyer is quoted as saying, "H.B. 4 was
a pivotal point for me because of the way I ran my shop ....I had a
low-volume, high-dollar-investment practice and my client population
was the type who were going to bear the brunt of H.B. 4-children,
housewives and the elderly. ' 86 This lawyer has completely changed
87
her practice and is now a mediator.
With specialists leaving this practice area or at least limiting their
amount of work in the area, the concerns raised by Galanter and
Luban about the indirect effects of tort reform noted earlier come to
mind. They were concerned with the consequences for the substance
of the law if the specialists left or diminished their activity, because
these are the lawyers who devise novel legal strategies that extend the
law. This same concern is echoed by a lawyer we recently interviewed, who said that
the civil justice system was set up to give people access to justice,
and that meant that you would have an opportunity to try novel
theories of law and you would have an opportunity to test theories
of factual scenarios and see whether or not juries agreed that certain
acts were negligent or not. And so, the system was never set up for
just the sure-fire winners. But now, given a cap on the damages, it
makes it a much bigger risk to take the marginal cases, because your
likelihood of recovery is limited financially, and you hafta decide
where you're going to spend your limited dollars; because we have
less income, we have less money to spend.
The potential impact of caps does not end here. Because referral
fees are a substantial cost factor, limiting awards may also affect the
referral system that moves complex or high-end cases to those lawyers
84. Donald, supra note 53.
85. Id.

86. Id.
87. Id.
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best able to handle such cases. This is especially important for medical malpractice cases, since lawyer referrals are the main source of
clients for many medical malpractice specialists.8 8 The next section
explores this potential impact with regard to medical malpractice.
C.

The Referral System

Just over two-thirds (68.2%) of the malpractice specialists in the
Plaintiffs' Lawyer Survey obtained fifty percent or more of their cases
from lawyer referrals. As Table 3 shows (using data from the Texas
Referral Survey), medical malpractice cases represent the largest category of cases in Texas referred for a fee, larger even than auto accident cases-which comprised the largest proportion of all tort cases.
In this section, rather than using data from the Plaintiffs' Lawyer Survey, we will use data from the Texas Referral Survey supplemented by
our interviews with Texas plaintiffs' lawyers.
TABLE 3
Top FIVE TYPES OF CASES REFERRED FOR A FEE:
ALL RESPONDENTS IN PRIVATE PRACTICE (N=861)
(Texas Referral Survey)
Type of Case

Number of Cases

Medical Malpractice
Auto Accident
Products Liability
Criminal
Employment

642
550
484
344
287

The referral system should provide incentives for moving cases to
the most skilled lawyers. Table 4 shows that for respondents to the
Texas Referral Survey who had referred at least one medical malpractice case, the most important reason for referring was that the case
was outside of the lawyer's practice area. The next most important
reason was that the case was in the lawyer's general practice area but
was too complex. 89

88. See supra tbl.2.
89. Respondents were asked to check all reasons that applied from a list of specific reasons.
These were the most checked reasons.
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TABLE

4

REASONS FOR REFERRING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
ALL WHO REFERRED AT LEAST ONE (N=195)

(Texas Referral Survey)
Reason

Percent*

Out of Practice Area
Too Complex
Geographic Distance
Caseload Full
Value Too Low
Value Too High
Most Cases Referred
* percentages will not add to 100% since
dents asked to check all that applied.

79.0%
43.1%
38.5%
18.5%
21.0%
11.3%
0.5%
respon-

When asked how a lawyer chose to whom to refer a case, Table 5
shows that by far the most important reason was a lawyer's reputation
followed by compatibility with the client. The size of the referral fee
was far less important. These two tables provide evidence for the idea
that, at least with regard to paid referrals for complex cases like those
involving medical malpractice, the referral system may indeed work to
move cases to the most competent lawyers.
TABLE

5

REASONS FOR CHOOSING THE LAWYER:
ALL WHO REFERRED AT LEAST ONE MALPRACTICE CASE

(Texas Referral Survey)
Reason

Important %

Neutral %

Unimportant %

Size of Fee (n=189)
Lawyer's Reputation (n=190)
Reciprocity (n-186)
Compatibility with Client (n=184)

11.6%
98.9%
16.7%
56.5%

21.2%
1.1%
18.3%
24.5%

67.2%
0
65.1%
19.0%

Given this evidence, the most important questions in the Texas Referral Survey for our purposes asked lawyers about the impact recent
tort reforms like HB4 would have on referral practices. Respondents
were asked whether these reforms would affect the referring of cases
with the expectation of a fee, and whether such reforms would affect
the acceptance of referrals for which a fee would be paid. Although
HB4 included other provisions beyond those dealing with damages,
the damage provisions were clearly the ones that defined debate over
HB4. Still, since there were other provisions in HB4 beyond the damage provisions, the responses to the Texas Referral survey questions
dealing with the impact of HB4 on referral practices should be taken
as suggestive and not definitive.
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TABLE 6A

IMPACT OF HB4-LIKE REFORMS ON REFERRAL PRACTICES:
RESPONDENTS MAKING PAID REFERRALS

(Texas Referral Survey)
Impact

% Who Refer Any
Any Case (n-320)

% Who Refer Any
PI Case (n=282)

% Who Refer Any
Med Mal (n=185)

Decrease Referrals
51.9%
52.1%
53.5%
No Impact
41.6%
40.4%
37.8%
Increase Referrals
6.6%
7.4%
8.6%
* statistically significant at the .05 level (chi square=10.3, 4 degrees of freedom)
TABLE 6B
IMPACT OF

HB4-LIKE

REFORMS ON REFERRAL PRACTICES:

RESPONDENTS ACCEPTING PAID REFERRALS

(Texas Referral Survey)
Impact

% Who Accept
Any Case (n=197)

%Who Accept
Any PI (n=131)

% Med Mal
Specialists (n=30)

Decrease Acceptance
60.9%
68.4%
90.0%
No Impact
36.0%
27.9%
6.7%
Increase Acceptance
3.0%
3.7%
3.3%
* statistically significant at the .05 level (chi square=12.5, 4 degrees of freedom)

When asked if reforms like HB4 would increase or decrease the
number of cases the respondent would refer with the expectation of
receiving a fee in return, Table 6a provides a clear message. Half of
those respondents making paid referrals of any kind said HB4 would
decrease the number of paid referrals they would make. Just over
forty percent (41.6%) said it would have no impact and 6.6% said it
would increase the number. For those who referred at least one personal injury case or one medical malpractice case, the percentages are
similar.
The Texas Referral Survey did not go further and ask respondents
why they responded as they did to this question. Perhaps the prospect
of diminished fees had some influence on those who responded that
their number of referrals would decrease after HB4, especially for
those with more contingency fee business. A more precise answer will
take additional research. But our recent interviews suggest that the
prospect of diminished fees is a possibility. Some lawyers accepting
referrals are cutting costs by lowering the referral fee they will pay,
potentially making it less attractive to refer the case. For instance,
one malpractice specialist said,
Before [HB4 and Proposition 12] I would typically send twenty-five
percent to thirty percent, sometimes thirty-five percent referral fee
back [to the referring lawyer].... Now it's kind of, you know, at the
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end of the case let me see how it is and then I'll send you something.
Or, I may not be able to send you anything.
Another said, "I've become more lean on exactly how much I'll pay
out in referral fees. . . . I'm trying to stick around the twenty-five
percent referral fee range ....
Sometimes we might do it on a third,

but the days of 50/50 (a fifty percent referral fee) are probably
history."
Lower referral fees may lead some attorneys to keep a case rather
than refer it. In this regard, a lawyer we recently interviewed said,
"I've heard lawyers say, 'Well, if he can get $450,000 for the case and I
can get $300,000 for it, that means I get $100,000 if I keep it [presuming a contingency fee of one-third]. If I send it to him, it means I get
$50,000 [for the referral fee-one-third of the other lawyer's one-third
contingency fee on $450,000], so I'll just keep it." This lawyer's fear is
that lower referral fees will entice more lawyers to keep the case in an
effort to maximize their return at the client's expense. If the case is
not referred, it is the client who suffers because the less capable lawyer gets an award lower than would have been achieved for the client
by referring the case to a specialist.
While Table 6a reflects less willingness to refer cases, Table 6b reflects less willingness to accept referrals. The message of Table 6b is a
strong one that gets stronger as it moves from lawyers accepting any
kind of paid referral, to those accepting paid personal injury referrals,
to the medical malpractice specialists. 90 Lawyers still wanting to refer
cases may find a smaller market for those referrals. This is especially
true' for those wanting to refer medical malpractice cases to a specialist. Almost all of the specialists in Table 6b said that they would be
accepting fewer cases. This is consistent with the discussion in the previous section-that medical malpractice specialists may be taking
fewer medical malpractice cases and that they will be screening more
strictly for the cases they do take, especially cases that involve Finley's
"hidden victims" of tort reform. In short, access to the best lawyers
may be limited, at least for certain kinds of people.
Whatever the faults of a system allowing paid referrals, such a system can move the cases of uninformed consumers to those lawyers
better able to handle them. Damage caps may, among other things,
substantially affect the incentives that make a referral system work,
especially with complex and expensive matters like medical malpractice. Caps on other types of complex cases will further undermine the
referral system.
90. Defined as respondents accepting at least one medical malpractice referral and having at
least fifty percent of their business comprised of contingency fee cases.
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CONCLUSION

Noneconomic damages have long been a target of tort reformers,
especially in healthcare-related cases. Reformers advocate severe, almost draconian caps on these damages because, they claim, these
damages are the cause of crisis in the healthcare system. 91 Their arguments are a rhetorical "Texas two-step," a dance that is presented as
one thing when it really is another. The political rhetoric says that
caps will lead to significantly lower malpractice insurance for physicians and thereby ensure the availability of healthcare services. Instead, our analysis suggests that caps on noneconomic damages serve
a different purpose-diminishing access to the civil justice system by
making medical malpractice or other healthcare cases financially less
attractive to contingency fee lawyers. And, it appears that caps may
serve this different purpose quite well. This purpose is the logical consequence of the "Dear Colleague" letter with which we began.
Perhaps the best summary of how well the cap on noneconomic
damages in Texas will serve this purpose can be found in the remarks
of an East Texas lawyer we recently interviewed. He built much of his
once successful practice on medical malpractice and nursing home
cases:
I built a medical malpractice and nursing home practice, and you
know there was a lot of good work that needed to be done there
and there still is. However, we had House Bill 4 and Proposition 12
passed in Texas, which virtually gutted anyone's ability to go in and
stand up for the rights of the elderly in the nursing home setting.
The biggest problem is the cap on damages; the $250,000 cap does
nothing more than hurt the children and the housewives and the
elderly the most, because they don't have any economic damages,
they don't have any earning capacity and they don't have any lost
wages.... In doing the nursing home cases the development costs
of my cases were between $60,000 and $100,000 out of pocket .... I
mean, the aides that are involved are usually scattered all over the
country-we've flown to Atlanta[, Georgia and] Columbus, Ohio.
The expert costs are between $20,000 and $30,000 per expert, so
costs add up fairly quickly. When you put a $250,000 cap on it, it is
economically unfeasible for someone to devote three years of their
life, three years of their time, invest $80,00 or $100,000 in the case,
hoping to just get that back. And you get paid roughly $30,000 a
year for doing something that is as difficult as any area of law. So,
you know, post-Prop 12, my practice was like this-there's a big
hole in it.
This lawyer has not filed any medical malpractice or nursing home
cases since September 2003 when HB4 went into effect. He is now
91. See Letter from Harold L. Jensen to policyholders, supra note 1.
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looking at business litigation, primarily because he believes it will be
less costly. He explained,
The upside to it is they generally don't cost as much in dollars to
develop, because your expert expenses and the number of depositions involved are usually less. You know, by comparison, in the last
nursing home case we tried in . .. January of 2004, there were fortythree depositions taken in that case. And the typical-or at least
what I've found so far-the typical business tort case you're looking
at ten or less, which at roughly $600 to $1,000 a piece, not including
your time, saves on case development.
When asked if he would take any more nursing home cases, this lawyer said no. With regard to medical malpractice, he stated that it is
unlikely that he would take any cases; but if so it would only be for a
client who is a substantial wage earner. In his estimation, these are
the only kinds of cases that are economically feasible.
When lawyers, especially the most skilled, are unable to take certain
kinds of cases on a contingency fee basis, meaningful access to the
civil justice system for injured people is diminished. For some-Finley's "hidden victims" of tort reform-the situation will be especially
acute, as the East Texas lawyer notes. Without meaningful legal representation these plaintiffs may be effectively left with no realistic
remedy for their injuries. In Texas, because the state constitution has
been amended to specifically authorize caps, they may also be left
with no avenue to challenge the propriety of the noneconomic damage cap. The one option left, according to a recent law review article,
is to apply to the states the right to a jury trial in civil cases found in
the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. 92 While
we make no endorsement, the findings presented here give some
credence to that claim.

92. See Wright & Williams, supra note 11, at 464-66.
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